All evidence
// MULTI_CHAIN_LAB · NO_LOGIN_REQUIRED
A Demo Run That Ended in a Real Signature.
A multi-chain evaluation drove a demo run end to end and finished with a genuine
Sign on the evaluator’s software token, with correlated evidence recorded on both sides. That is a narrow result on a lab stack, and it is worth exactly what its conditions allow — which is why the conditions are here rather than in a footnote.// BLACK_BOX_CONTRACT
The Rule That Makes the Result Mean Anything.
The multi-chain layer treats the signing service as a black box. It never invents a signature and never invents an audit line, and the pass condition is written so that it cannot quietly do either.
Dual evidence or it did not happen
A pass requires evidence rows on the multi-chain side and a matching audit record on the signing side for the same activity. A reported success with no corresponding audit line is recorded as a failure, not as a partial pass.
Two correlators, not one
The run carries a primary identifier on the multi-chain side and a secondary identifier that equals the request id in the signing service's own audit record. Matching them is what ties one system's claim to the other's evidence.
Real cryptography, real audit chain
The signature is produced by the signing service against its token, and the audit record enters the same HMAC-chained trail as any other operation. Nothing about this path is a simulation of the signing step.
Why the contract is stated first
An integration demo can always be made to look successful from one side. The contract is the reason this result is citable at all, so it precedes the result rather than qualifying it afterwards.
// WHAT_WAS_DEFERRED
One of Three Checks Was Not Attempted.
The end-to-end signature and its dual evidence passed on the live stack. The third check — reading the signing service’s own audit log directly to cross-verify — was not attempted, by explicit choice rather than by failure.
Why it was deferred
The audit log is not reachable through the tunnel the multi-chain layer uses, by design — that tunnel carries the signing RPC and nothing else. Cross-checking the log directly needs access to the evaluation VM itself, which was out of scope for that session.
What that costs the result
The correlation was verified through the portal's audit surface rather than by reading the signer's log on the host. That is weaker than a direct read, and it is recorded as deferred rather than folded into the pass.
On-chain confirmation is also absent
The run reached a signature, not a funded, confirmed on-chain transaction. Confirmation on a public test network was an optional follow-on and has not been attempted.
Limit
This is a lab result. The evaluation path runs plaintext transport inside an SSH tunnel rather than customer-grade mutual TLS, drives a software token rather than certified hardware, and moves no funded value. It demonstrates that the integration reaches a real signature under a contract that would catch a fake one. It is not a product, and no reading of it should describe it as a deployed service.
// IDENTIFIERS
The Correlators Are Recorded, and Publish With the Correction.
The run's identifiers exist on both sides and are held in the evaluation record. They are not printed on this page yet, and the reason is a consistency problem on our side rather than a sensitivity one.
Why they are not here yet
A sibling repository's README still states that no live signature has been completed through this path — a statement the evaluation record contradicts. Publishing identifiers for a run while another A3E9 source says it never happened would give a reviewer two of our own documents that disagree, and the identifiers would be the half that looks fabricated. The README correction and the identifiers ship together.
// WHAT_A_TOKEN_ADDS
The recorded run is one that already happened. A token lets you invoke a new demo run and correlate its identifiers yourself, which is a different claim from reading ours.
Everything above is checkable without contacting anyone, and is meant to be read first. The token exists because the remainder needs a provisioned environment — not because the evidence is being held back.